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Abstract:
Observing electronic voting from an international point of view gives some perspective about its 
genesis and evolution. An analysis of the voting process through its cultural, ontological, legal and 
political dimensions explains the difficulty to normalize this process. It appears that international 
organizations  are  not  capable  to  properly  defend  the  fundamental  rights  of  the  citizens.  The 
approach that  was  taken when DRE voting computers appeared seems to  have reoccured with 
VVAT voting computers and the european e-poll project.  
Keywords: VVAT, DRE, voting computers, e-voting, electronic voting, e-poll, electronic voting 
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I - Time lines on facts
I.1 - Genesis of electronic voting
The history of electronic voting is short. We intend here to give a quick review about the spread of 
electronic voting systems of all different flavors (voting computers1, kiosks2 and internet voting3). 
We make a distinction between two types of dissemination of electronic voting systems.
The  first  type  is  found  in  countries  which  have  a  strong  willingness  to  use  electronic  voting 
systems. These e-voting developers countries encourage companies, that are in most cases local, to 
produce such systems. The majority of these companies were already involved in security or bank 
1 To use a voting computer, each elector must go in his/her usual election poll where s/he can register his/her intent of 
vote directly on the voting computer. At the end of the election period the voting computer gives the sum of the 
votes that it computed. 
The term "voting computer" will be prefered to "electronic voting machine" because the latter is often abbreviated in 
"voting machine" which already refers to mechanical voting machine (like the lever machine). Using the same term 
to refer to two different objects inevitably leads to confusion and should be strongly avoided. 
2 Kiosks allow each voter to process his/her vote from any poll station. Thus, all the kiosks are linked to a central 
serveur which controls the unicity of each vote, registers the intents of votes, and expresses the results at the end pf 
the voting period.. 
3 An internet voting system  is a remote voting system whom functionality are close to kiosks. The main difference is 
that electors don't from from a controlled place (the poll station), but from any computers that is linked on internet.
activities and invested in this new market because e-voting technology is simple, easy to produce 
and offers  a  significant  profit  margin.  In  addition the  competition between companies  is  weak 
because the market  is  segmented by the necessity  for  the e-voting products to  conform to the 
election laws of the country it is developed for. 
We find this situation in countries that make extensive use of electronic voting: Netherlands (with 
the Dutch company NEDAP), but also in the United States (with the American companies Premier4 
or Election Systems and Software-ES&S), in India (CMC Limited is a subsidiary company to the 
Indian Tata), in Belgium where the voting system has been developed by local firms and also in 
Brasil:  since  19965,  this  country has  been using voting computers,  specially  developed by two 
American vendors: Unisys (50,000 computers) and Diebold (350,000 computers). These Brasilan 
voting computers were designed by the Electoral  Supreme Court  (Tribunal  Superior Eleitoral  - 
TSE).
We find the same situation in countries that use electronic systems on a minor scale: Australia 
developed its own system eVACS, the Estonia states developed their own internet voting systems.   
The  second type  is  found in  e-voting  adopters  countries  which  decided  to  use  voting  systems 
coming from foreign countries: we find Nedap voting computers in Germany, France, Ireland, Italy 
and Poland; there are Indian voting computers in Nepal; ES&S voting systems have been used in 
France and United Kingdom; the Spanish company Scytl exports in Finland, Philippines, Australia, 
Switzerland; Indra, another Spanish company, supplies France. 
I.2 - Success and failures
E-voting assessments differs according to their authors.
Electoral official organizations are generally very satisfied with the e-voting systems they decided 
to use, especially among e-voting developers countries. 
The electors opinion is much contrasted. We distinguish three typical groups.
1 - The early adopters group is composed by technophiles who are by definition very enthusiastic 
about e-voting. They lose their faith in technology when it becomes obvious that voting systems are 
not more reliable than usual computers.
2 - The sceptical  group is quantitatively small.  It  is a heterogeneous group which encompasses 
computer scientists, technophobes and security experts. This group’s tendency is to doubt whether 
e-voting is useful and to question officials. 
3 - The median group brings together the majority of the voters. These persons obviously respect 
official decisions and, at first, accept the idea that e-voting is a neutral media to vote, even if they 
observe some practical  problems when they vote.  By practising e-voting,  their  opinion moves, 
generally by analogy with well-known objects or situation (pocket calculators, computers, money-
transfer, etc.) that are commonly presented by media, even if they are not appropriate. After an 
astonishment period, they become capable to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages. 
These different populations are confronted by difficulties that appeared after a few elections which 
used electronic systems.
Many  errors  were  reported  in  the  registration  of  votes.  It  was  also  reported  that  some voting 
computers failed to start up, encountered breakdowns or showed some strange behaviour.
For instance, in the USA, the Montgomery County Election Board published a report about the 
2004 presidential  election which stated that "189 voting units (7%) of units deployed failed on 
Election Day. An additional  122 voting units  (or  5%) were suspect based on number  of votes 
captured" [Montgomery County Election Board 2005]. "A few machines in Miami-Dade County 
4 Formerly Diebold
5 Electronic voting was generalized through the whole country in 2002.
reset  themselves  while  voters  were  trying  to  vote.  Precincts  in  Palm  Beach  County  reported 
problems activating some of the electronic cards used to authenticate the voters. Even mark-sense 
ballots designed to be read by optical scanners proved troublesome" [Mercuri 2002]. "In November 
2003 in Boone County, Indiana over 144,000 votes were cast even though Boone County contains 
fewer than 19,000 registered voters." [Simons 2004]
In Belgium, during the 18 May 2003 election day, an error of 4096  votes has been discovered. It 
had been impossible to explain or reproduce this error, even after examining the faulty computer 
Rapport Chambre et Sénat belge 2004, page 21].
In Québec, where electronic voting was used to process 95% of the votes in the local elections of 
2005, so many problems were encountered that  the city decided to return to traditionnal paper 
ballot: results arrived hours in late, some materials broke down, internet connexion had been cut 
and many votes had been counted twice by error [Beaulieu 2006].
In addition, researchers demonstrated that some voters were not able to vote independently because 
of their lack of experimence with computers (digital gap) [Birdsall et al. 2005]. It was also discovered 
that electronic computers were not well  adapted to blind people.  In addition,  controversy arose 
around the  lack of  transparency,  security,  and reliability.  Researchers  demonstrated that  it  was 
impossible to check the results which are automatically delivered and also that results could be 
tampered with without detection.  
With the exception of Ireland, which decided to not use the 75,000 voting computers that were 
previously bought,  most  of the concerned states that were deeply involved in electronic voting 
reacted by asking for improvements, thinking that problems were due to the lack of experience and 
could be easily fixed. In the USA, for example, with the Help America Vote Act, the congress 
allocated $3,8  billion to states for improvement of voting system infrastructure, voter education, 
and training of election officials [Shelley 2004].  
In addition, some countries, like Venezuela, moved to the new concept of Voter Verified Audit 
Trail  first  expressed by Rebecca  Mercuri  [Mercuri  2000].  The  USA,  the  South  Korea  and the 
Kingdom of  Belgium would  appear  to  be  following this  trend,  forgetting  the  fact  that  adding 
complexity to a system always makes it become more fragile and less reliable. 
Among the countries that experimented on a very limited scale, some just stopped their trials (Italy, 
Spain), waiting for a better technology, while some others are still continuing with experiments but 
without any extension, (France, UK,  Switzerland, etc. ).
At a supranational level, Europe goes further by starting deployment of the e-poll system which is 
supposed to manage "polling preparation, voters' identification and authentication, authorization, 
vote casting, vote counting and communication of the results" in the name of the reinforcement of 
the  European  integration.This  projects  includes  biometric  identification,  centralization  of  the 
uniqueness of each vote and the possibility for the voter to vote from any poll station.
I.3 - International Organizations
During  this  period  different  international  organizations,  such  as  the  Office  for  Democratic 
Institutions  and  Human  Rights  of  the  Organization  for  Security  and  Cooperation  in  Europe 
(OSCE/ODIHR)  or  the  European  Union  (EU), sent  assessment  missions,  observing  electronic 
voting systems as traditional voting ones. 
Some international organizations produced some guidelines about elections that explicitly take into 
account electronic voting ([United Nations 2005], [ComVe 2002]). 
It  seems that  international  organizations consider electronic  voting as a  tool  which may aid in 
making  elections more peaceful. For many years, these organizations have been confronted with 
major  disorders  in  polling  stations,  including  voter  intimidation,  ballot  stuffing,  ballot  box 
replacement, etc. Voting computers would seem to be a radical solution for such problems6.
II - Obstacles to a supranational organization of vote
Many obstacles present themselves when an attempt is made to define a unique set of precise rules 
which may be applied to the organization of a democratic election, or a unique voting system that 
could be used by several different countries because an electronic voting system is a highly comp-
lex, multi-dimensional object.
II.1 - Cultural Obstacles
Traditions  are  different  in  different  countries,  including  differences  in  voting  activities.  These 
voting traditions include, for example:
- the format of the ballot: while many countries use an Australian ballot, a French voter still votes 
by choosing one ballot which holds the name of the candidate or the list that s/he prefers. Australian 
ballots can present also different aspects: people have to write numbers or to fill a circle or to mark 
a column, etc. Any change in these habits can have huge consequences and may change the result of 
the vote7. 
- the susceptibility to fraud depends strongly on the history of the country. Italy encounters many 
problems because of the informal mafia; in France, before the obligation to use transparent urns, 
ballot stuffing was common. Young democracies with a little experience of voting procedures are 
not sufficiently aware of these possibilities for fraud and are therefore unable to take measures to 
minimize them.
- different vote couting systems are in use: For example Run-Off Voting is used in France, Ireland 
uses Single Transferable Vote, Germany uses Mixed Member Proportional, Norwegians vote with 
an Additional Member System, etc.
- in addition the organization of the polling office can take many different forms depending on the 
size of  the polls,  the number  of urns,  the number  of officials,  the possibility for  the voters  to 
actively participate in the organization of the polling day (in France, in each poll office, voters 
usually count the votes at the end of the poll day), the counting process, the totalization process, the 
publication of the results, etc.
Differences may exist even within a single country: in France the publication of the results is very 
different from a city to another. Some make public the detailed results (poll by poll) including the 
numbers of procurations and signatures on the registry to control the uniqueness of each vote, some 
others publish only the number or the percentage of the votes obtained by each candidate.
The introduction of a new voting procedure should be prepared by an apprenticeship based on the 
practical knowledge people get, and targetted to the different categories of population that have to 
manage with the new system: citizens, electoral organizations, judges, lawyers, etc. The actual lack 
of knowledge makes the people worrying about false problems. but incapable of detecting and 
diagnozing eventual real  malfunctioning.  This situation is  very risky because if  a real  problem 
occurs and is  not  detected in time,  the consequences could be huge,  technically (if  ballots  are 
spoiled for instance), thus politically, considering that an election can not be done again.
6 This argument is explicitly used by suppliers to convince their customers. On the web site of the manufacturer 
Unisys  which  equipped  Brazil,  we  can  read  a  declaration  of   Paulo  Cesar  Camarão,  Information  Technology 
Director  of  the   Electoral  Supreme Court,  saying  “One of  the  principal  benefits  of  the  solution  is  that  it  has 
completely eliminated the chance for fraud in our elections ” 
7 In 2007, in Scotland, local elections and scottish parliament election took pace the same day). The usual ballot 
format has been adapted to this double election, this new ballot caused confusion for several thousands of people 
whose ballots had been invalidated.
II.2 - Ontological Obstacles
Eliminating human involvement in the voting tabulation appears to be a protection against fraud, 
errors  or  misbehaviour.  The  human  risk  is  then  replaced  by  technological  risk  that  can  be 
statistically evaluated. This approach is usual in many areas including technological innovations 
like fast trains, nuclear power plant, etc.
But, in this analysis, the complexity of electronic voting systems has been underestimated because 
two major dimensions of this object were ignored. Firstly, such systems are supported by computers 
which  are  not  stable.  There  are  constant  updating  and  upgrading  (on  software,  drivers, 
periphericals) that make it almost impossible to follow the classical certification approach because a 
certified object should be recertified each time it is modified. Secondly, the laws that decide the 
rules for voting are also susceptible to change, forcing the voting system to be quickly adapted to 
the new law.
This potential constant evolution (electronic and legal) of an electronic voting system constitutes an 
high level of risk that is not met by any other technological object.
II.3 - Legal Obstacles
The common voting criteria that are defined by the Venice Commission are very poor and do not 
fix all the parameters of the voting process. The e-poll project cites this six principles "of Europe’s 
electoral  heritage":  Universal  suffrage,  Equal  suffrage,  Free  suffrage,  Secret  suffrage,  Direct 
suffrage, Frequency of election. These criteria are far from being sufficent to define the conditions 
that  must  be  in  place  in  the  organization  of  a  democratic  election:  there  is  no  word  about 
transparency and the necessity  for the voters  themselves to  control  the election and eventually 
contest the results [Enguehard 2008]. 
Elections  depend on  the  respect  of  fundamental  values  which  have  not  been enough precisely 
defined in Europe. The European Convention on Human Rights defines the right to vote for every 
citizen but does not interfere in the electoral contentious affairs that could lead to invalidate an 
election. This text is only a framework and does not give any information about how to conduct an 
election. Therefore the European Court on Human Rights is not competent on elections. 
The  Venice  Commission  does  not  define  explicitely  the  essential  independance  of  the 
organisationnal  body  in  the  case  of  electronic  voting.  This  question  is  crucial  because  it  is 
impossible to check whether a computer is independent or not. 
In addition this commission confused mechanical and electronic voting methods and thus produced 
recommandations  on  e-voting  that  are  not  operational.   For  example,  the  principle  43  states 
"Electronic voting methods must be secure and reliable" and gives some definition of reliability and 
security  but  do  not  precise  how the  level  of  security  and  reliability  should  be  evaluated.  The 
principale 44 adds that "the system’s transparency must be guaranteed in the sense that it must be 
possible  to  check  that  it  is  functioning  properly."  but  the  range  of  this  transparency  and  the 
conditions to get an effective transparency are not enonciated. 
II.4 - Political Obstacles
Introducing electronic voting causes deep changes in  the habits and rights of the citizens who may, 
therefore, be unwilling to accept this evolution. In France, in addition to the officials, traditional 
polls are under the eyes of scrutinizers, official delegates from parties and magistrates, the counting 
is  directly  processed  by  citizens.  The  introduction  of  electronic  voting  simply  suppressed 
scrutinizers while officials, official delegates from parties and magistrates can no longer control 
anything except what the voting computer accepts to display or print. This lack of popular, political 
and legal invigilation contributes to diminish the confidence in the electoral system.
We have alse to note the  resurgence of regionalism in Europe, since the 1980s  which is a political 
translation of the cultural differences [Keating 2003]. 
III - Limits
Many international assessment missions took place in countries where electronic voting systems are 
in use:  DRE voting systems8, VVAT voting systems9, or internet voting systems10.
III.1 - Limited observations on DREs
Several observation mission did took place in countries using DRE voting machines. The lack of 
transparency of these new technological systems did not alert the international observers at the first 
stage because their guidelines did not include these new objects. 
While  UEM  do  not  say  a  word  about  electronic  voting  in  its  observation  guidelines,  the 
ODIHR/OSCE   updated  its   Election  Observation  Book,  in  an  effort  to  take  in  account  the 
apparition of electronic voting in its fifth edition in 2005. 
Becoming conscious of the inobservability of DRE voting computers, the ODIHR/OSCE sent an 
expert mission  in 2006 in Belgium "to increase [its] comparative knowledge of e-voting systems, 
also with a perspective on how to most effectively observe such processes. " This report express 
clearly that "observation of the e-voting system is  de facto  limited to an analysis of the security 
mechanisms in place, and to an observation of their implementation." [odihr/OSCE Belgium 2006].
III.2 - A case studies: the Voter-Verified Audit Trail (VVAT)
A VVAT voting computer presents to each voter a printed version of its ballot in order to give 
him/her the possibility to check that it complies with his/her choices. These ballot papers are kept in 
a urn, so there is a theoritical possibility to verify the results of the computers by counting manually 
the content of the urn. The main idea is that only a part of the urns would have to be recounted (to 
save time and money). 
Many international  organizations  produces  documents  that  tend to  give  favor  to  VVAT voting 
computers.
The Venice Commission11 expressed "electronic voting should be used only if it is safe and reliable; 
in particular, voters  should be able to obtain a confirmation of their votes and to correct them, if 
necessary,  respecting secret  suffrage;  the  system must  be  transparent;"  but  it  did  not  give  any 
operational definition of transparency to define what should be transparent to who.
The ODIHR/OSCE stated "In the absence of a paper trail, which could allow the voters to verify the 
accuracy of their vote, and would provide for possibilities of a paper recount in case of doubt, there 
is no way the above mentioned aspects can be directly observed."[odihr/OSCE 2006]  
The ODIHR/OSCE observation book simply warns to be aware of "Electronic voting systems with 
no voter-verified auditable paper trail or other manual audit capacity.", letting think that electronic 
voting systems with audit capacity are acceptable.[odihr/OSCE 2005]
All  these  guidelines  have  been  conceived  in  reaction  to  the  opaqueness  of  the  DRE  voting 
computers and have been built on a consensus between the participants without working towards a 
8 Presidential election in USA [odihr/OSCE USA 2004], federal election in Belgium [odihr/OSCE Belgium 2007], 
presidential  election in France  [odihr/OSCE France 2007],  parliamentary elections in  Netherlands  [odihr/OSCE 
Netherlands 2007]
9 Parliamentary elections [EU EOM Venezuela 2005] and  presidential elections in Venezuela [EU EOM Venezuela 
2006]
10 Parliamentary elections  in Estonia ([odihr/OSCE Estonia 2007]
11 which confuse mechanical and electronic voting methods, ignoring the ontological difference of these two objects.
complete analysis of the new system they favor, following the same approach that let the DRE 
systems been deployed without any reaction.
An analysis of The VVAT reveals that there is a complete lack of safeguards to frame this recount 
possibilities: the VVAT process is verifiable that is far to mean verified. Technically, if its results 
are not verified a VVAT is  equivalent to a DRE voting computer, including all the DRE defaults 
that are now well known12.
So, VVAT voting computers pretend to improve the reliability of the voting process. Actually, if 
there is no recount, there is no reliability. At least the right to recount should be unforce by law. 
Thus, observations must precisely concentrate their attention on the real verifications that are made 
and  they  must  deal  with  complex  questions  that  imply  legal,  organizational  and  technical 
dimensions. For instance, it should be decided what should happen, if a voter claims that the printed 
ballot paper does not reflect her/his choice (will s/he be believed, being unable to prove her/his 
intent?). How, when and by who are chosen the computers whose results are audited? Who do 
recount manually the ballot papers? Are the ballot papers counted just after the election and in the 
poll stations, or days after election in another place? Who can ask for a recount and obtain it? 
Legally, what should happened if the ballots counting differs from the automatic counting? etc.
These questions are not yet taken in account as is evident from the observation mission that was 
deployed for the parliamentary election in Venezuela. VVAT computers were used to vote but the 
observation mission did not pay enough attention to these questions  [EU EOM Venezuela  2005]. 
The second mission, to a presidential election, just noted a few percentages relating to  the increased 
number  of  polling  stations  in  which  the  voting  receipts  were  counted  but  were  not  present  to 
observe whether the choice of the machine was really random or whether best security practices 
were adhered to during the transportation  and recount of the ballots [EU EOM Venezuela 2006].
Finally it should be kept in mind that even if the right to recount becomes guarantied, real recounts 
will become more and more rare because, historically, we can see that once a task is done by 
computers,  humans cease to manage it.  VVAT computers have been build to conquest the lost 
confidence of the voters. Voters will ask for recounts until they recover their confidence in the 
voting system, and then, once the confidence back, they will stop to ask for recounts. 
III.3 - A case studies: the e-poll project
The e-poll project was one of the e-en project founded by Europe. This project is based on the 
Venice Commission which reflects the consensus between the partipant countries. We did not find 
any deep analysis about the feasability of this project. It is a kiosk system, allowing people to vote 
from any poll station. Biometry is used to identify the voter. The system prints a receipt to give the 
voter an insurance that his/her vote has been taken in account. 
Experian, the company responsible for the "Regulations and Specifications" working package had 
several experiments in electronic voting. It organized the vote for the French living abroad in 2006. 
One of the reports, published by an expert who audited the system during the vote period, revealed 
that there were no safeguard to close poll stations where only a very few voters (one or two) had 
been  previously  registered.  These  poll  stations  opened  despite  the  risk  of  not  respecting  the 
confidentiality of the cast vote  [Pellegrini 2006]. In fact , during the vote period, Experian suddenly 
became aware of this problem and decided to close several poll stations with a few registered voters 
(Kabul, Bandaar, Riga, Skopje Tbilissi, Reykjavik, Colombo, Ulan-Bator, etc.), destroying the few 
votes that were already cast. Voters were not informed that their votes had been canceled in this 
operation.
The option of voting from any polling station, which electronic voting systems may offer, can lead 
to similar problems. If all the countries in Europe are taken into account it is strong possibility that a 
12 A VVAT computer is a DRE computer with a printer and a process to conduct the ballot paper to the urn. This 
additional features may breakdown and thus, fragilize the entire process. 
citizen of a country with a small population might well be the only voter taking part in his national 
elections from   a particular foreign polling station. 
A  court  case  revealed  that  during  the  same  election  dozens  of  citizens  voted  with  the  same 
computer. The decision makes clear that the judge did not realize that this "group voting" reveals a 
loss of confidentiality [Conseil d'État 2007]. 
This case is a simple example which shows that the poor capability to anticipate problems is often a 
characteristic of e-voting implementations.
In addition, the capacity to identify the voter, register its vote and respect the confidentiality of the 
vote cannot be demonstated to voters. Generally speaking, this project does not consider the crucial 
dimension of transparency, despite its strong involvement in legitimating the results of the election 
process.
Finally, e-poll claims that it is "fostering the active participation of the population in the voting 
process",  whereas all  the experience of the last  15 years shows that  electronic  voting does not 
increase  the  turnout  rate.  Actually,  opposite  to  an  "active  participation",  this  system  deprives 
citizens of the right to control the voting process, forcing them to a passive attitude.
This project presents has many other deficiencies that can not be detailed here.
Conclusion
Many  governments  which  face  a  strong  political  opposition  are  waiting  for  the  international 
organizations  to  standardize  voting  procedures  and  electronic  voting  systems,  even  if  several 
scientists  claim that  the  defined  standards  present  serious  problems  and  that  such  certification 
procedures do not solve the majority of security or usability problems [Alexander 2004], [Mulligan 
2004], [McGaley 2006], [Barr 2007]. Until now, international organizations limit themselves to a 
search for political consensual positions which make up only a minimal set of the conditions that 
are necessary to ensure democratic elections. In addition their assessment missions are limited to 
observing only what is defined in this incomplete consensus, while ignoring more pertinent criteria.
With the case of the e-poll project we saw how Europe fails to protect the citizens' interests because 
of the lack of definition of a precise set of fundamental rights. Such a goal can be attained only 
through negotiation because some countries would have to change to conform the new rules, and 
not by consensus.
The economic dimension is also at stake because electronic voting is now a market whose interests 
may not be the same than the citizens' ones. 
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